


ROUTING SLIP

To	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1.	Mr. Robert Komer 344 Admin Bldg.		
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7.			
	RETURN TO SENDER		

ACTION	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION
COMMENT	FILE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

4/4/60



✓ Hope this helps - Its
vast - personal views & not
"the channels" - so implies
no one else's views.



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FROM

NAME AND ADDRESS



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PHONE NO.

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Noted by DD/I

6 Apr 60

4 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Komer

SUBJECT : Vincent Rocks Paper on National Security Policy

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1. In reading over the final version with its summary and conclusions, I find myself in agreement. I feel that my past written and oral comments to Rock have about exhausted my recommendations up to the point of establishment of such a small staff in the National Security Council. I am pleased that the proposal has shifted from a RAND-IDA type organization to a small staff. I think Rock has done an outstanding job.

2. While I might nit-pick a few of his specific recommendations, I would prefer to list some things which must be kept in mind when such an office, as is proposed, is established. These recommendations will have within them certain modifications for the execution of some of Rock's specific recommendations.

3. I feel particularly urged to make comments along the lines of an operating philosophy for such an office now, in as much as I may soon be leaving those of my responsibilities which keep me in touch with research.

4. There are, of course, my own views and represent no staffing. In short, I would recommend that Bob Amory go along with Rock's paper at the Planning Board meeting, suggesting informally, as he sees fit, any of the points I make in the attachment regarding the operating philosophy for the proposed staff.

Attachment:

As stated

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Suggestions to be Kept in Mind in the Conduct of the Proposed Office of
Special Studies, National Security Council

1. The following principles or philosophy are set forth as a guide to the conduct of the proposed office:

a. Staff must be familiar with and understand on-going Government programs as a point of departure for National Security policy research to assure; (1) consideration of existing practice and accomplishments, and; (2) direction of its recommendations to the present situation, making those recommendations more realistic and avoiding "impossible recommendations". In order to accomplish this, access must be guaranteed in the beginning and security clearances (SI and Q) must be provided. The staff must "know" what is going on.

b. Staff emphasis should be placed on highest level national security research, rather than the coordination of departmental research.

c. Greater care must be exercised to avoid "boon-doggles" and the staff should be familiar with past "boon-doggles".

d. The chief of the office must not be so identified with a given political position that the staff's work will be "suspect".

e. Staff should avoid interference with departmental desires for departmental research, but should in this connection carefully assist departments in working together.

f. No pressures on dead lines should be thrown at the staff in connection with national security policy research. A quick consensus of views in and out of government might be sought and obtained on any issue but should be so labeled.

g. An open door must be maintained for new ideas but not in a manner that makes the staff susceptible to charges of partisan influence.

h. Staff must be kept small in its early days (3 to 5 is suggested), developing only as a wise choice of effort dictates.

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i. Maximum security care must be taken to avoid reputation of looseness and thus inhibit the staff by departmental worries on this score.

j. Staff must be free to travel and consult both here and abroad.

k. Research must be understood to involve a "gamble", i.e., after a staff decides that human competence, good resources, and an appropriate subject are likely to produce a new policy insight -- then the research "bet" is made. No prejudgment should obtain that XYandZ will be the result; if so, it will not be research but rather "proof" of someone's opinion.

l. There must be an area of free staff actions in addition to the area of responsiveness to requests of National Security Council members.

m. An atmosphere of freedom and informality should obtain. Policy studies, if handled properly, should be thoroughly understood (and in most cases supported) by departmental representatives before presentation.

n. Staff should be free to recommend new operational techniques (NSC/OCB) and new policy (NSC/NSCPB) as well as new science policy (Science Advisor and panel) in addition to new political and military policy. No area should be withheld and thus avoid the charge that the staff does not know what is going on.

o. Staff studies when ready for presentation may be introduced officially in different ways -- to Planning Board through Special Assistant or member, to OCB through Chairman or member, to a department as a primarily responsible component, to two (2) or more components as jointly responsible, directly to the NSC. In other words, staff must be free to present in the best manner (and not present if staff believes results not valuable), while at the same time not getting into a position of a protagonist that rises or falls on one issue.

p. Staff competence should represent knowledge of foreign affairs, political, military, economic, research, intelligence, scientific and technical, operations, government organization, budget, security, and above all "whats going on". Skills must be present in informal organization, techniques of getting information without endless bureaucracy, ability to explore and probe without close supervision, etc.

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q. Staff must be able to visualize in the abstract the relationships of political and scientific matters without sacrificing its common role to experts of either category.

r. Staff must be able to think through or obtain the thinking through of abstract ideas to realistic and achievable policies -- given the practical capabilities of the national security area.

s. The chain of command for the staff should be within the White House area. No influential person at the departmental level should be able to "sink" the staff or cut off its access.

t. The staff might on occasion examine a specific policy or operational matter for the President -- this would, in effect, give the staff more experience. Also, to help its experience, some of the special commissions might be run from the staff -- such as the Draper, Gaither, Sprague, etc. groups.

u. Staff members must keep in constant touch with responsible and knowledgeable personnel throughout the government.

v. Staff must be free to study problems which might appear not to be of concern in the immediate future and thus lack priority, but which in effect require action soon to avoid serious problems some years hence. (Many examples of this in last 15 years -- Africa, Latin America, Panama, Missiles, etc. One coming up may be "Who Wins the Origin-of-Life" research race with all its implications for atheistic communism versus the religious west and the religious inbetweens from the developing areas). In fact, the current situation in all areas should be checked for future changes -- whether political or scientific.

2. If the above suggestions on operating philosophy are acceptable, they should underlie actions authorizing the proposed staff and selection of its personnel.

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